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THE CRUCIAL "CORRUPT INTENT" ELEMENT IN FEDERAL
BRIBERY LAWS
BRENNAN T. HUGHES*
I was a first-grader the first time I got in trouble at school, and it
may have been the event that set me on the path to becoming a lawyer.
Our teacher evaporated from the classroom, leaving behind a
worksheet to busy us students in her absence. I was studiously
completing my worksheet when, suddenly, I found myself lying on the
cold, orange-tiled classroom floor. Another boy, for reasons
unknown, had risen from his seat and shoved me out of mine. Before
I knew what was happening, the boy was on top of me-I was being
attacked! I was struggling with the boy in an attempt to return to my
assigned seat when our teacher returned; she was displeased. In the
end, we both were disciplined for "wrestling."
My sense of fairness was deeply wounded that day. I admit, I was
technically out of my seat. I admit, I was technically locked in a
physical struggle with my seven-year-old assailant. But, being
punished felt deeply unfair-I was a victim! I lacked any intent to do
wrong. Although my actus reus apparently violated school policy, my
mens rea was pure as snow.
This mildly harrowing tale of my youth illustrates the
momentousness of the mens rea element of any crime. When courts
give short shrift to criminal intent, guiltless actors can be swept into
the criminal justice system. As the United States Supreme Court has
* Brennan Thomas Hughes, B.A., M.A. (Freed-Hardeman University), M.Div.
(Lipscomb University Hazelip School of Theology), J.D. (Vanderbilt University
Law School), judicial clerk for the United States Court of Appeals. The author is
grateful for the tutelage given by Professors Bob Cooper and Robert Mikos in
election law and federal criminal law. This article is dedicated to the author's three
sons Dexter, Eliot, and Chet, who may sometimes be manipulated with bribes.
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recognized, this danger is particularly acute among federal anti-
corruption statutes.1
The cluster of federal criminal laws that can be described as anti-
bribery statutes are alarmingly easy to violate. Many people want
favors from public officials, many people treat public officials
generously, and public officials do favors for each other. That is
simply how the system works. Sometimes, however, these favors can
resemble illegal gratuities and quid pro quos. When individuals and
groups influence public officials, how can courts and juries distinguish
political corruption from mere political effectiveness?
Admittedly, real bribery-bribery that harms the integrity of the
political process-is a critical issue that should be vigorously
prosecuted. However, courts should construe anti-corruption laws
narrowly so public officials and donors need not live in fear that their
legitimate campaign contributions or shrewdly executed backroom
deals may expose them to criminal liability. Accordingly, this article
argues that the "corrupt intent" element found in many bribery
statutes, requiring juries to use their own moral reasoning to determine
if a benefit given to or from a public official was given with an evil
mind, is crucial. Without this "evil mind" element, swaths of benign
political activity would be criminal. For this reason, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that anti-corruption laws should be narrowly
construed.2 The best way to construe them narrowly is to ensure that
corrupt intent remains a robust element of these offenses.
To pilfer a phrase from Justice Harlan in Griswold v. Connecticut,
the word "corruptly" in the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b),
sits on its own bottom. 3  This article specifically argues that the
adverb "corruptly" must carry some meaning in addition to the quid
pro quo described by the other statutory elements. Breathing life into
"corruptly" is necessary to avoid the rule against surplusage and to
comply with the United States Supreme Court's desire, expressed in
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, that criminal
anti-corruption statutes be narrowly construed to avoid capturing
1. See infra Part I (discussing United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal.,
526 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1999)).
2. See infra Part II (discussing judicial application of anti-corruption laws).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) ("The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.").
26 [Vol. 51
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benign political activity. 4 The corrupt intent element achieves this
end by demanding that juries, in addition to uncovering a quid pro
quo, exercise their moral intuition and find that the defendant offered
or accepted the bribe with an evil and blameworthy purpose. As a
paradigm to demonstrate the functionality of the corrupt intent
element of the crime of bribery, this article focuses on bribery-by-
campaign contributions.5
Part I surveys the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, and its
legislative intent. Part II examines how federal appellate opinions
have treated the term "corruptly"-in cases involving § 201 as well as
in other federal laws that prohibit bribe-like activity-with particular
attention paid to the phenomenon of campaign contributions as bribes.
Part III assesses "corrupt intent" in light of the element's historical
background and discusses how different political philosophies yield
divergent definitions of political corruption. Part IV attempts to
delineate the circumstances under which a campaign contribution is
given "corruptly," thus constituting an unlawful bribe.
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal bribery and gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201,
describes several ways to violate its provisions. The provision
criminalizing bribing a public official, provides:
(b) Whoever-
(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises
anything of value to any public official or person who has been
selected to be a public official, or offers or promises any public
official ... to give anything of value to any other person or
entity, with intent-
(A) to influence any official act; or
(B) to influence such public official ... to commit or
aid. . . any fraud .. . on the United States; or
(C) to induce such public official . . . to do or omit to do any
act in violation of the lawful duty of such official or
4. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Escenbach, 459 F.3d 1033, 1039 (10th Cir.
2006) (discussing the rule against surplusage); Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. 398, 406-07
(1999) (narrowly construing public corruption statutes).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
4
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person ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned for not more
than fifteen years, or both. .. 6
Subsection (b)(2) has similar wording, but describes the crime
from the perspective of the official rather than the person offering the
bribe.'
Bribing a public official thus requires proof of five essential
elements: (1) a public official; (2) the defendant's corrupt intent; (3) a
benefit-"anything of value"-given, offered, or promised to the
public official; (4) a relationship between the thing of value and some
official act (or fraud or omission of duty); and (5) the relationship
must involve an intent to influence the official in carrying out the
official act (or to induce the fraud or omission).
Subsection (c) of § 201 describes the crime of unlawful gratuity.9
This crime is important to the discussion of "corrupt intent" because
6. Id. § 201(b)(1).
7. Subsection (b)(2) provides that whoever:
(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official,
directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or
agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other
person or entity, in return for:
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act;
(B) being influenced to commit or aid ... any fraud ... on the United
States; or
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official
duty of such official or person ... shall be fined. . . or imprisoned ....
Id. § 201(b)(2). This article will refer to subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) collectively as
"the Federal Bribery Statute."
8. See id.
9. Subsection (c) provides, in part, that whoever:
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official
duty-
(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to
any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public
official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by
such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a
public official; or
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person selected to
be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper
discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives,
accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for or
[Vol. 5128
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the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal
Bribery Statue emerged in the context of differentiating it from the
Federal Gratuities Statute.10
In order to prevent anti-bribery laws from criminalizing normal,
productive political behavior, the corrupt intent element must be read
to narrow the scope of those law. In particular, the element must
require there be something intuitively immoral about the act in
question, beyond the mere presence of a quid pro quo.
In this regard, Sun-Diamond fundamentally shaped the application
of § 201. There, the United States Supreme Court attempted to
differentiate a bribe under § 201(b) from an unlawful gratuity under §
201(c). 1 The Court specifically compared the language in the Federal
Bribery Statute ("intent to influence any official act") with the
language in the Federal Gratuities Statute ("for or because of any
official act"), and found the fundamental difference was that bribery
requires a specific quid pro quo.12  The Court held that § 201(c)
required the prosecution to prove some connection between the
gratuity and an official act, whereas under § 201(b) the giving of the
"thing of value" would constitute a "bribe" only if the gift-giver
intended to influence a particular official act in the future.13
Accordingly, the Court emphasized the primary difference between
these two crimes is the briber's intent to effectuate a quid pro quo.
However, defining bribery as a quid pro quo involving a public
official does not obviate the statute's difficulties. The second
element--corrupt intent-appears to demand something more. When
"anything of value" is given to a "public official" with the "intent to
influence" some "official act," .a quid pro quo, including a specific
intent mens rea, has been established. What function, then, does the
corrupt intent element serve? As discussed infra, some courts define
"corruptly" as intending to execute a quid pro quo; however, this
because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official
or person ....
Id. § 201(c). This article will refer to subsection (c) as "the Federal Gratuities
Statute."
10. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398
(1999). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) with id. § 201(c).
11. See generally Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. 398.
12. Id. at 404-05.
13. Id.
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definition effectively reads the word out of the statute. 14 Defining
"corruptly" in a way that simply restates other elements of the crime is
redundant and directly conflicts with the statutory interpretation rule
against surplusage.15
The effect of omitting the "corruptly" element is: many public
officials will unwittingly violate the terms of the Federal Bribery
Statute on a regular basis. One instance is what is known as "state-
bribery," which occurs when one public official receives a political
benefit from the official acts of another public official. 16
Hypothetically, for example, candidate A may agree to refrain from
running against candidate B for state senate if candidate B will
endorse candidate A in the state house race. Another common
practice that could arguably violate the Federal Bribery Statute is
"logrolling" (also known as "vote-trading"). 1 7  Logrolling occurs
when, for example, legislator A offers to support legislator B's bill if
legislator B supports additional funding for legislator A's pet project.
Both of these illustrations involve a quid pro quo, and both are the
sorts of agreements legislators make on a regular basis. Yet,
legislators who swap political favors and votes are not necessarily
criminals. As discussed infra, most of these agreements are not
corrupt, because they neither harm the character of the official nor are
they against the interest of the public.' 8
Another common and benign political phenomenon that could
technically violate the Federal Bribery Statute is a campaign
contribution from a special interest group. To use a hypothetical
14. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001) ("The
Court has often said that every clause and word of a statute should, if possible, be
given effect.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033, 1039 (10th
Cir. 2006) ("The rule against surplusage encourages courts to give meaning to every
word used in a statute to realize congressional intent. In effect, this rule embodies
the belief that Congress would not have included superfluous language.").
16. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate
Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 813-14 (1985) [hereinafter Lowenstein,
Theory ofPolitics].
17. Id.
18. Judges who sit on panels also participate in logrolling. See F. Andrew
Hessick & Jathan P. McLaughlin, Judicial Logrolling, 65 FLA. L. REv. 443 (2013),
arguing against "blanket condemnation" of judicial vote-trading, in light of its
potential benefits.
30 [Vol. 51
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example, the National Rifle Association (NRA) makes political
contributions-in the forms of money and positive publicity-to
candidates who support the interests of gun owners. These
contributions are made with the understanding that, in return for the
NRA's support, the candidate will be motivated to vote in ways that
further the Association's goals. Many other organizations across the
political spectrum engage in similar conduct.19  Does an issue-
advocacy organization violate the Federal Bribery Statute when it
contributes to a political campaign-especially when a bill that
interests the organization is up for a vote? 20 Few would argue that it
does.
Individuals and interest groups make campaign contributions
using one of two strategies. In an electoral strategy, the person or
entity chooses a candidate who appears to represent their interests and
contributes to that candidate in order to get the candidate elected.21
On the other hand, in a legislative strategy, a person or entity makes
campaign contributions to candidates, not necessarily to help that
candidate's election, but to influence that candidate in respect to
certain issues.22 Neither of these strategies is inherently corrupt.23
However, when a donor uses a legislative strategy and attempts to
19. See generally William M. Welch II, Comment, The Federal Bribery
Statute and Special Interest Campaign Contributions, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1347 (1989) (reinterpreting the Federal Bribery Statute in a way that
purports to more effectively limit the influential power of special interest groups
over public officials).
20. Id. (discussing the effectiveness of the Federal Bribery Statute in regard to
campaign contributions by political action committees).
21. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, When is a Campaign Contribution a
Bribe?, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 127, 137 (William C. Heffernan &
John Kleinig eds., 2004) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions]; Daniel
Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of all Evil is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301, 308-09 (1989) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Root of
Evil], available at http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/ hlr/vol 1 8/iss2/2.
22. Lowenstein, Root ofEvil, supra note 21, at 308.
23. See Lowenstein, Theory of Politics, supra note 16, at 18. Lowenstein
appears to believe that campaign contributions made as part of a legislative voting
strategy are bribes-both immoral and illegal-and are not currently prosecuted
only because the practice is so pervasive (and perhaps practically necessary). See
Lowenstein, Root of Evil, supra note 21, at 329. I disagree. See also Bruce E. Cain,
Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111,
113-18 (1995), critiquing Lowenstein's views.
31
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influence an officeholder's decisions by giving targeted campaign
contributions, the threat of creating an illegal quid pro quo becomes
very real.24
Therefore, ascribing independent substance to the corrupt intent
element of bribery is necessary on two grounds: to avoid rendering the
corrupt intent element redundant, but also to avoid criminalizing
innocent conduct.
Defining corruption as merely quid pro quo, without requiring
more, criminalizes a range of common, beneficial legislative behavior.
Without this freestanding "corruptly" element, the Federal Bribery
Statute risks being over-inclusive and could lead to unintended
consequences. First, the statute's broad scope creates a danger of
selective prosecution. If most politicians regularly violate the statute
(by trading political favors or votes, or by accepting contributions
from special interest groups), then a prosecutor could use the statute to
target almost any public official at any time. Second, because some
types of quid pro quos are common and useful features of the
legislative process, the expansive reach of the Federal Bribery Statute
threatens to punish or deter otherwise innocuous legislative behavior.
The threat of selective prosecution and potentially broad liability
could have a chilling effect on productive political activity.
Some courts and legislatures have recognized this danger, and
have thus required that prosecutors prove corrupt intent as a stand-
alone element of the crime of bribery. 25 This requirement mitigates
the risk of over-inclusivity and enables juries to distinguish legitimate
campaign contributions from unacceptable bribes. 26 As courts have
24. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 707 F.3d 607, 613-14 (6th Cir. 2013)
(exploring the thin line separating the political donor who "gives money in the hope
of unspecified future assistance" and who makes a contribution so the public official
will "do what I asked him to do"-only the latter of which is a "corrupt bargain"
and, hence, a bribe).
25. See Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions, supra note 21, at 132 ("[T]he
corrupt intent element adds a normative requirement that is not entirely captured by
the descriptive elements.").
26. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently explained, the
presence or absence of a corrupt agreement is the type of question "juries are fully
equipped to assess":
[M]otives and consequences ... are the keys for determining whether a
public official entered an agreement to accept a bribe, and the trier of fact
is quite capable of deciding the intent with which words were spoken or
32 [Vol. 51
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recognized, not every campaign contribution is "a bribe in sheep's
clothing." 27  Accordingly, juries must parse the individual facts to
determine when a campaign contribution contains a "corrupt bargain"
that seeks to turn a public official into "a donor's marionette." 28
In some instances, when state bribery statutes have omitted the
corrupt intent element, courts have read the element into the statute. 29
These opinions appear to recognize that without some sort of
normative intensifying factor, like corrupt intent, bribery laws would
criminalize the day-to-day transactions of most politicians. 30
Once corrupt intent is understood as a freestanding element of
bribery, the problem becomes how to sculpt a workable definition of
"corruptly." 3 1 The corrupt intent element adds to the quid pro quo
actions taken as well as the reasonable construction given to them by the
official and the payor.
Terry, 707 F.3d at 613 (quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 225, 274 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Agan v. Vaughan, 119 F.3d 1538, 1542-44 (lth Cir. 1997)
(suggesting that a corrupt intent is required on constitutional grounds when the bribe
is a campaign contribution); see also State v. O'Neill, 700 P.2d 711, 859 (Wash.
1985) (construing bribery statute to require proof of a defendant's corrupt intent);
State v. Alfonsi, 147 N.W.2d 550, 553, 555 (Wis. 1967) (reading an intent to
defraud requirement into a state bribery statute). The Alfonsi court also noted that
"the element of Scienter is the rule rather than the exception in our criminal
jurisprudence. This is particularly true with respect to the crime of bribery, which
by its inherent nature has traditionally required a corrupt motivation." Id.
30. Agan, 119 F.3d at 1544 (suggesting that without a corrupt intent element
bribery laws could interfere with political speech protected under the First
Amendment).
31. The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) and the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws have advocated for the removal of the term
"corruptly" from American laws because they believe the term to be too nebulous.
For example, the A.L.I.'s Model Penal Code Commentary on section 240.1,
"Bribery in Official and Political Matters," suggests that "the requirement of
'corrupt' purpose provides virtually no guidance as to the intended scope of the
law ...... Eric J. Tamashasky, The Lewis Carroll Offense: The Ever-Changing
Meaning of "Corruptly" Within the Federal Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGIS. 129, 176
n.7 (2004) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 240.1 at 5, 8 (1980);
STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FED. CRIMINAL CODE § 1361 at 127 (Nat'l Commission on
Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws 1970)).
33
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element by requiring juries to make an intuitive judgment about
whether the conduct at issue was immoral under the circumstances.
However, there is no one-size-fits-all definition of corruptly. 32
Rather, prosecutors must argue to the jury some theory of why the
quid pro quo was corrupt. The precise theory will differ from crime to
crime and jury to jury. The important fact is that not all quid pro quos
are immoral. Defining corruption as an element that depends on the
"moral judgment" of the jury ensures that benign quid pro quo actions
will not engender unmerited punishment. Moreover, a bribery
instruction that requires the jury to find an "evil mind" or "morally
blameworthy" motive would put public officials on notice that,
although they will be penalized when their political arrangements
violate society's intuitive principles of fairness, duty, and justice, they
will not be held liable for innocuous quid pro quo behaviors.
The proposition that "corrupt intent" is an additional substantive
element beyond the quid pro quo is expressed in Matthew Bender's
Modern Federal Jury Instructions for Bribery of a Public Official:
Corrupt intent means simply having an improper motive or
purpose. The defendant must have promised, offered or given
money or a thing of value to the public official with the deliberate
purpose of influencing an official act of that person. This involves
conscious wrongdoing, or as it has sometimes been expressed, a
bad or evil state of mind.33
32. As Professors Mills and Weisberg explain in their historical survey of the
word "corruption":
In history and the social sciences, there is a vast academic literature on the
subject of describing and defining corruption-a body of work so vast that
we can only briefly allude to it here. But any review of this scholarship
must acknowledge that it is very difficult to derive any consensus
definition of corruption or to measure the alleged harm of what positive
law calls corruption, and that any effort at a positive or even normative
definition of corruption is heavily contingent on independent economic,
political, and social factors.
David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar
Crime, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1378 (2008).
33. 1-16 Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal, 16.01 (Matthew
Bender) [hereinafter Jury Instructions].
34 [Vol. 51
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This instruction, which continues to be used in bribery trials,34
does an adequate job of expressing both the quid pro quo aspect of
corrupt intent as well as the something more-"a bad or evil state of
mind." 35 The instruction illustrates that the corrupt intent element
requires juries to make an additional finding of intuitively immoral
motivation. Similarly, the United States Attorneys' Criminal
Resource Manual, while recognizing that "the statute is a little
confusing in this respect," counsels federal prosecutors to specify to
the court that the word "corruptly" in the Federal Bribery Statute
"simply means 'with a bad or evil purpose."' 36
Therefore, as both a practical and theoretical matter, anti-bribery
laws must carry an element of corrupt intent. Determining corrupt
intent requires a moral judgment on the part of the jury. Without this
element, anti-bribery laws threaten to criminalize a great deal of
benign political behavior. Presently, not all courts agree with this
conclusion.
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF "CORRUPTLY" IN
FEDERAL APPELLATE OPINIONS
Is this "moral judgment" understanding of corrupt intent being
followed by federal appellate courts? This Part traces the
development of the interpretation of "corruptly" and demonstrates
that, although the moral judgment interpretation is still alive, most
courts construe "corruptly" as simply requiring a quid pro quo without
addressing--or perhaps even realizing-that this creates redundancy
within the statute.
A. "Corruptly" in § 201 Cases
An early and seminal case construing the Federal Bribery Statute
is Schneider v. United States, in which the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that providing a jury instruction on bribery that
34. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 674 (4th Cir. 2004)
(district court instruction reflects language from Jury Instructions, supra note 33).
35. Jury Instructions, supra note 33, 1 16.01.
36. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 2044 (1997)
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL], available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm02044.htm.
12
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merely required "criminal negligence" was reversible error. 37
Bribery, the court said, is a specific intent crime. 38 Accordingly, the
jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
possessed, per the correct portion of the jury instructions, "an evil
intent to violate the law." 39
Another frequently cited case is United States v. Brewster, where
a United States Senator was allegedly bribed by a lobbyist to oppose
postal rate increases. 40 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, a professor with a
leading reputation in the field of Election Law,4' calls the Brewster
opinion "long, confused, and highly evasive."42 In an article
concerning campaign contributions as bribes, Lowenstein opines that
"little purpose" would be served by extensively analyzing the case. 43
However, the United States Attorneys' Criminal Resource Manual
contains an entire section analyzing Brewster.44
The Brewster court analyzed § 201 in terms of the differences
between bribery and illegal gratuities, 45 holding that illegal gratuity is
a lesser included offense of bribery and that what separates the two
offenses is the requisite level of intent.46 The court held that the
"corruptly" element of the Federal Bribery Statute "bespeaks a higher
degree of criminal knowledge and purpose" than the analogous
element in the Federal Gratuities Statute. 47 Likewise, the Federal
Bribery Statute's phrase, "in return for being influenced in the
performance of any official act," implied a higher degree of intent
than the language of the Federal Gratuities Statute, to accept the same
thing of value "for or because of any official act." 48 Brewster thus
37. Schneider v. United States, 192 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1951).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
41. Daniel Hays Lowenstein's Biography Page, UCLA LAW, available at
https://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/daniel-hays-lowenstein/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2014).
42. Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions, supra note 21, at 138.
43. Id.
44. U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 36, § 2045.
45. See Brewster, 506 F.2d 62.
46. Id. at 73, 83.
47. Id. at 71; see 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012).
48. Brewster, 506 F.2d at 71-72.
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concluded that an otherwise legal campaign contribution could
constitute a bribe under certain circumstances, but could never amount
to an illegal gratuity: 49
Every campaign contribution is given to an elected public official
probably because the giver supports the acts done or to be done by
the elected official ... there is no distinction in the case of an
elected public official between an illegal gratuity and a perfectly
legitimate, honest campaign contribution.5 0
If there is a specific quid pro quo, however, a campaign contribution
can be a bribe. 5 1 The court found that the trial judge in Brewster's
case correctly defined "corruptly" as doing an act "voluntarily and
with a bad or evil purpose to accomplish an unlawful result." 52
In United States v. Arthur, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit drew from Brewster's "specific" quid pro quo language and
the wording of the West Virginia bribery statute in its own effort to
construe the intent element of the Federal Bribery Statute. 53  West
Virginia, like some other states,5 4 defines a bribe as "any pecuniary
benefit as consideration for the recipient's official action as a public
49. Id. at 77, 81.
50. Id. at 73; cf id. at 77 ("[A]ll bona fide contributions directed to a lawfully
conducted campaign committee or other person or entity [besides the candidate
himself] are not prohibited by 201(g) [what is now § 201(c)]."). In Brewster,
however, there was evidence that the Senator's campaign committee was a sham,
thus exposing the Senator to illegal gratuity charges. Id. at 66; see also Lowenstein,
Campaign Contributions, supra note 21, at 135 (examining different reasons why
campaign contributions cannot be treated as "things of value" in an unlawful
gratuity prosecution).
51. Brewster, 506 F.2d at 82.
52. Id. at 80.
53. United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734-35 (4th Cir. 1976); see
Brewster, 506 F.2d at 72 ("The bribery section makes necessary an explicit quid pro
quo which need not exist if only an illegal gratuity is involved.").
54. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-148 (West, Westlaw through
enactments of Public Acts of the 2014 Feb. Reg. Sess. Of the Conn. Gen. Assemb.);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-101 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:27-2 (West,
Westlaw through L.2014, c. 75 and J.R. No. 3); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4701
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 171, 173 to 198 and 200 to 204);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.02 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Third Called Sess. of
the 83rd Legis.); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-102 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Budget
Sess.).
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servant."55 This conceptual intersection between bribery and contract
law further fleshes out the briber's state of mind-he wishes to create
a binding contract with a public official, in violation of the official's
sworn duties.56
The Ninth Circuit directly tackled the definition of "corruptly" in
the Federal Bribery Statute in United States v. Dorri." During
deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge to clarify the meaning of
"corruptly."58 The judge had previously instructed the jury, using a
model jury instruction for the Ninth Circuit, that "[a]n act is
'corruptly' done if it is done voluntarily and intentionally to bring
about either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful
method with a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other
benefit to one's self or to another."59
The defendant found this definition problematic because it
effectively negated his defense. The defendant claimed he was not
soliciting a bribe, but rather was setting up a one-man sting
operation. 60 However, the defendant's innocent undercover work
would be considered "corrupt" under this definition: he was seeking
"a lawful result by some unlawful method" for "some benefit"
because he hoped to impress his boss by exposing the bribe.61
Because the trial judge and counsel were unable to concoct a better
definition, however, the judge instructed the jury that if they found "a
gap between the law and the facts as you see them," they should deal
with the gap "just by filling it, collectively." 62 The majority of the
Ninth Circuit found no plain error or abuse of discretion and affirmed
Dorri's conviction.63
55. Arthur, 554 F.2d at 735 (emphasis added).
56. See id; see also U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 36, § 2044 ("[A]
bribe purchases a service (or at least is intended to do so) and is therefore bargained-
for; a gratuity is more in the nature of a tip.").
57. United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).
58. Id. at 890.
59. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
60. Id. at 890-91.
61. See id. at 890.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 892.
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Dorri64 vividly demonstrates the tension in the law of bribery that
forms the heart of this article-the dominant quid pro quo definition
of bribery is intuitively over-inclusive. Juries understand that some
morally innocent behavior can be classified as a bribe, and they
recognize the need for some extra ingredient to separate the truly
corrupt and blameworthy actions from those that merely violate the
letter-but not the spirit-of the law. Although the trial judge in
Dorri seemed unable to capture this distinction in the form of a jury
instruction, his response comes close to the position this article
advocates, by instructing the jury to fill in the gap "collectively."65 In
other words, the judge instructed the jury to draw from their own
collective powers of discernment and to rely on their consciences and
collective intuition to differentiate good from evil, even when the text
of the law provided them inadequate guidance in doing so.
But this is not the last word from Dorri.6 6 Ninth Circuit Judge
Kozinski vigorously dissented, arguing that it was the judge's job to
figure out the law and to instruct the jury properly, despite the defense
counsel's failure to offer an alternative instruction. 67 "Corruptly," he
explained, "is a concept that can't be easily captured in a single
formula, as it varies too much from situation to situation."68 Judge
Kozinski further elaborated that:
Conduct is corrupt if it's an improper way for a public official to
benefit from his job. But what's improper turns on many different
factors, such as tradition, context, and current attitudes about
legitimate rewards for particular officeholders. . . . Attempts to
cabin the definition of "corruptly" within a single rule have proven
unsatisfactory.6 9
Judge Kozinski recognized that the model instruction on "corruptly"
was "hopelessly circular: If Dorri's conduct was illegal, then he was
using an unlawful method, which means he was acting corruptly,
64. Id. at 888.
65. Id. at 890.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 892 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 894 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
39
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which means his conduct was illegal."70 Judge Kozinski therefore
concluded that corruption "can only be defined case by case....
Because there is no workable generic definition of 'corruptly,' the
district court should have tailored its instruction to the facts and
circumstances of this case," which to Judge Kozinski meant that Dorri
would only have acted corruptly if he intended to keep the money for
himself.7' Even the majority, despite upholding the conviction,
expressly agreed with Judge Kozinski's treatment of the term
"corruptly." 72
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court weighed in with United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Calhfornia.73  There, the Court
discussed the difference between the "intent to influence" necessary
for a bribery conviction under § 201(b) and the gift "for or because of
an official act" in the § 201(c) gratuities provision.74 Based on this
variation in language, the Court held the greater offense of bribery
required a finding of a specific quid pro quo-something of value
given in exchange for an official act-while an illegal gratuity merely
required some link between the gift and a past or future official act."
Unfortunately, in the wake of Sun-Diamond, many courts have
defined "corruptly" purely in terms of a quid pro quo. 76 Yet, Sun-
Diamond did not address the "corruptly" element at all.n In
differentiating bribery from gratuities, the Court focused solely on the
"intent to influence."7 8 The gifts given to the public official in Sun-
70. Id. at 895 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 894-95 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Jennings,
160 F.3d 1006, 1019 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Even if a court does not properly define
'corrupt intent,' it can adequately convey that concept to the jury by describing the
exact quid pro quo that the defendant is charged with intending to accomplish.").
72. Dorri, 15 F.3d at 892 (dictum) ("We have no quarrel with the dissent's
very eloquent explanation of the law of bribery.").
73. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
74. Id. at 404.
75. Id.
76. Commentators have also equated these concepts. See, e.g., Flynn Burke,
Brittany Libson, & Matt Trout, Public Corruption, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1371,
1380 (2013) (defining corrupt intent under 18 U.S.C. § 201 as intent to execute a
quid pro quo).
77. The word "corruptly" appears in the Sun-Diamond opinion just twice,
when the statute itself is quoted. Sun Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404.
78. Id. at 405.
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Diamond could not constitute bribes under § 201(b) because they were
not part of a quid pro quo arrangement. 79 Had there been a quid pro
quo, the corrupt intent element would have come into play to
determine whether the specific quid pro quo was corrupt and, thus, an
unlawful bribe.
The Court's rationale in Sun-Diamond reinforces this reading of §
201(b). The Court explained that criminal anti-corruption laws should
be narrowly construed because they are merely strands in an "intricate
web of regulations, both administrative and criminal, governing the
acceptance of gifts and other self-enriching actions by public
officials." 80 These criminal statutes, the Court said, are but "the tip of
the regulatory iceberg."81
If the Federal Bribery Statute is to be narrowly construed, the
"corruptly" element logically can accomplish that narrowing. At
present, the United States Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed the "corruptly" element of § 201(b), and lower courts are
mistaken to believe Sun-Diamond stands for the proposition that
proving bribery requires only quid pro quo without corrupt intent.
The majority of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for
example, fell precisely into this trap.82 In Alfisi, a fruit and vegetable
wholesaler argued that, rather than being a participant in a bribe, he
was a victim of extortion. 83 It was the routine practice among
wholesalers at the Hunt's Point Market to pay kickbacks to USDA
inspectors to prevent them from deliberately miscalculating the
contract price of their produce. 84  Alfisi claimed the bribery and
gratuity charges levied against him were actually based on his
attempts to induce the inspectors to carry out their duties faithfully.85
The majority opinion misconstrued Sun-Diamond, stating "[t]he
'corrupt' intent necessary to a bribery conviction is in the nature of a
quid pro quo requirement; that is, there must be 'a specific intent to
79. See id. at 402, 404-05.
80. Id. at 409.
81. Id. at 410.
82. See generally United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002).
83. Id. at 148.
84. Id. at 147-48.
85. Id. at 150.
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give ... something of value in exchange for an official act.""' Thus,
according to the Second Circuit, if a quid pro quo was proven, Alfisi's
only recourse would be to argue the defense of coercion." Although
the court cited Sun-Diamond, an opinion that stated criminal anti-
corruption laws should be narrowly construed, the Alfisi majority
pointed to the "danger of underinclusion" to bolster its holding that
quid pro quo involving a public official invariably constitutes
bribery. 88
Judge Sack dissented from the Alfisi majority, and persuasively
argued that corrupt intent must be a separate element of bribery.
Judge Sack believed the "corruptly" element requires that the briber
seek to corrupt the official. "Bribery," he stated, "in essence is an
attempt to influence another to disregard his duty while continuing to
appear devoted to it or to repay trust with disloyalty." 89  Beyond
merely seeking a quid pro quo, therefore, "the benefit sought must
entail a breach of duty or trust." 90 Citing the "well-settled rule of
statutory construction that all parts of a statute, if at all possible, are to
be given effect," Judge Sack accused both the majority and the district
court of merely using the statute's other terms to define "corruptly,"
86. Id. at 149 (citing United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S.
398, 404 (1999)) (emphasis added). As previously noted, the function of this
statement in Sun-Diamond was to compare the Federal Bribery Statute's phrase
"intent to influence" to the phrase "for or because of an official act" in the Federal
Gratuities Statute. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405-06. Sun-Diamond paid no heed
to the word "corruptly" in § 201(b); it was outside the scope of the question
presented. See generally id. See also supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
87. Alfisi, 308 F.3d. at 150-51.
88. Id. at 151. Oddly, the Alfisi majority, in the course of arguing that Sun-
Diamond does not require them to construe § 201 narrowly, makes the point in a
footnote that Sun-Diamond "says nothing about bribery, especially with regard to
how the term 'corruptly' should be interpreted"-in spite of the fact that the
majority had just defined "corruptly" by quoting from Sun-Diamond. Id. at 149, 151
n.4 (citing Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 409-12).
89. Id. at 155 (Sack, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Sollazzo v. Esperdy,
285 F.2d 341, 342 (2d Cir. 1961)); see also John S. Gawey, Note, The Hobbs
Leviathan: The Dangerous Breadth of the Hobbs Act and Other Corruption Statutes,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 383, 400-01 (2011) (emphasizing the corrupt intent
element and noting that under the common law extortion and bribery "required a
corrupt state of mind").
90. Alfisi, 308 F.3d at 156 (Sack, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 5142
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thereby effectively reading "corruptly" out of the statute.91 He argued
that the quid pro quo element described in Sun-Diamond arose not
from the term "corruptly," but from the term "to influence." 92
Because the Sun-Diamond Court never considered the "corruptly"
element, it would be a mistake to read Sun-Diamond as conflating the
"corruptly" element with the necessity of a quid pro quo. 93
Judge Sack's understanding of "corruptly" is correct. If
"corruptly" describes a situation in which an official is tempted to
breach public trust or to act hypocritically, the jury must so decide by
way of its moral intuition. Although moral terms like "breach of
duty," "disloyalty," and "evil state of mind" are familiar to common
experience, they prove difficult to define. But putting flesh on these
nebulous terms is exactly the sort of thing juries are designed to do.
The salient point is this: federal appellate courts face statutory
construction issues in the application of the Federal Bribery Statute.
The solution is to recognize that Sun-Diamond is not the final word on
bribery. Indeed, the point of Sun-Diamond was to define unlawful
gratuities. The Court did so by comparing gratuities to the "intent to
influence an official act" element of bribery. The rule against
surplusage and the Supreme Court's directive that criminal anti-
corruption laws be narrowly construed demand that "corruptly" must
therefore carry some independent meaning. Specifically, "corruptly"
signals that evil is afoot, and it demands that juries make case-by-case
determinations as to whether the behavior they are asked to judge is
truly morally blameworthy.
B. Bribery and Corruption Under Other Federal Laws
There are federal laws other than the Federal Bribery Statute that
contain the "corruptly" element, while others include bribery as a
lesser included offense. Some of these laws can also be triggered by a
campaign contribution. This section briefly illustrates how a corrupt
quid pro quo can trigger these other federal criminal laws, and how
these laws relate to the Federal Bribery Statute and the element of
corrupt intent.
91. Id. (Sack, J., dissenting) (citing Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott &
Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633 (1973)).
92. Id. at 157 (Sack, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Sack, J., dissenting).
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 51 [2014], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol51/iss1/4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
1. Hobbs Act
The majority of federal appellate court opinions in which
campaign contributions are alleged to be bribes arise not in the context
of the Federal Bribery Statute, but in the context of the Hobbs Act.94
The Hobbs Act criminalizes, among other things, any extortion that
affects commerce in any way.95  The term "extortion" in the Act
includes "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced ... under color of official right." 96 The punishment for a
Hobbs Act violation includes a sentence up to twenty years. 97
Hobbs Act case law has evolved in such a way that a violation for
extortion under color of title almost perfectly mirrors the Federal
Bribery Statute. In Evans v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court upheld its earlier decision in McCormick v. United States that an
explicit quid pro quo is necessary for a Hobbs Act color-of-title
extortion conviction.98 Two particular holdings from Evans are
especially noteworthy. First, the quid pro quo need not actually
materialize-the Act is violated by the existence of the agreement
itself.99 Second, Evans essentially eliminated the coercion element of
extortion by noting that the mere fact that a public official holds
public office is coercive in itself.'00 In other words, the public
official's "official power" is what induces the bribe. Thus, if a
campaign contribution is proven to be part of a specific quid pro quo,
and that contribution or agreement "in any way" affects commerce,
the Hobbs Act has been violated. '
94. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
95. Id. § 1951(a).
96. Id. § 195 1(b)(2).
97. Id. § 1951(a).
98. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992), aff'g McCormick v.
United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). Evans involved a cash payment of $7,000 to a
member of the Dekalb County, Georgia, board of commissioners, as well as a
$1,000 check payable to the commissioner's campaign. Id. at 257. The check, part
of an FBI sting operation, was reported on Evans's state campaign-finance
disclosure form. Id. But this disclosure did not shield Evans from criminal liability.
See id.
99. Id. at 268.
100. Id. at 266.
101. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (finding that even
a de minimis impact on commerce-in this case, a slackening in the interstate
[Vol. 5144
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Although the Hobbs Act does not contain a corrupt intent element,
this element logically carries over into Hobbs Act crimes, especially
because the Court described color-of-title extortion almost
synonymously with § 201(b) bribery. In fact, Hobbs Act cases have
mirrored bribery cases in that some courts require a corrupt intent
element while others define the crime purely in terms of quid pro
quo.102
2. Mail or Wire Fraud
In addition, bribery by way of campaign contributions can be
prosecuted as mail or wire fraud. Mail or wire fraud, as defined in 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346, involves a scheme to defraud
someone of property or the intangible right of honest services.10 3 This
crime includes a jurisdictional hook, which requires that some sort of
mailing or interstate wire communication occur. 104  Therefore, if a
public official's conduct constitutes § 201(b) bribery or a Hobbs Act
color-of-title extortion and, in addition to these elements, the official
uses the mail, internet, or an interstate telephone call in the process,
the conduct is punishable by up to twenty years in prison.'05 Since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Skilling v. United States,
the "intangible right of honest services" in § 1346 includes "only
bribery and kickback schemes."' 06
movement of sand to a concrete business-is enough to support a Hobbs Act
prosecution).
102. To quote one analysis: "The Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals attempt to approximate a corrupt intent element without using the
'corruptly' language. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals
expressly recognize a corrupt state of mind requirement, but treat it as surplusage."
Jeremy Gayed, Note, "Corruptly:" Why Corrupt State of Mind is an Essential
Element for Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1731, 1779 (2003).
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2012).
104. Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
105. Id. The mail fraud statute, § 1341, also provides for punishment up to
thirty years if certain conditions are met. See id. § 1341.
106. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010); see also United
States v. Terry, 707 F.3d 607, 611-12 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that "Skilling made
clear" an honest services violation must piggyback on a bribe or kickback).
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 51 [2014], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol51/iss1/4
46 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
Skilling10 7 suggests that a violation of § 1346 by depriving the
public of its right to honest services encompasses bribery under §
201(b). If an honest services violation requires a bribe or a kickback,
it logically follows that such a bribe would be defined in terms of the
federal bribery provision. Thus, bribery appears to have become a
lesser included offense of a mail or wire fraud honest services
violation. In other words, while a simple bribe would violate §
201(b), which is punishable by up to fifteen years in prison, a bribe
that also involves the use of mail or wire transmissions would be a
mail or wire fraud violation, punishable by up to twenty years in
prison. An honest services bribery charge under § 1346 would then
incorporate all the elements of bribery, including corrupt intent.108
3. Federal Program Bribery
Another federal law implicated by bribing a public official is the
federal program bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666.109 Section 666
applies when a bribe involves an agent of an organization or local
government who receives at least $10,000 per year in federal funds.o"0
The types of organizations involved in a § 666 violation include
almost all local governments and many state and local agencies."'
Under this statute, the crime is committed when the agent "corruptly
solicits or demands ... or accepts or 'agrees to accept, anything of
value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in
connection with any business, transaction or series of transactions of
107. Skilling, 561 U.S. 358.
108. Id. at 412 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 666(a)(2)) ("[The honest services
fraud statute's] prohibition on bribes ... draws content . . . from federal statutes
proscribing-and defining-similar crimes.") (citation omitted). However, in a
recent article summarizing mail and wire fraud, the implied corrupt intent element
does not receive a single mention. See Alexa Briscoe, Mail and Wire Fraud, 50 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1245 (2013).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
110. Id. § 666(b).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Dransfield, 913 F. Supp. 702, 710 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting "Congress's intent that the term 'Federal program' be broadly
construed").
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such organization ... involving any thing of value of $5,000 or
more."11 2
The United States Supreme Court interpreted this statute in two
important cases: Salinas v. United States and Sabri v. United States,
both of which addressed the question of whether it is necessary under
§ 666 to show a connection between the bribery and the federal
funds." 3 It is not. 114 Although the "corruptly" element appears in §
666, just as it does in the Federal Bribery Statute, the Court in Salinas
and Sabri did not explore that element." 5 As with the Federal Bribery
Statute, courts have found violations of § 666 when the bribe was a
campaign contribution."16
In sum, the corrupt intent element of the Federal Bribery Statute is
also an element of Hobbs Act extortion by color-of-title, mail or wire
fraud premised on a deprivation of the right to honest services, and
federal program bribery. Therefore, this article's conclusions
regarding the "corruptly" element apply equally to these other federal
crimes.
III. BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION IN LIGHT OF
HISTORY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
In his United States v. Aguilar concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
opined that the term "corruptly," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1505, was not
unconstitutionally vague.117  In fact, he explained, the term has "a
longstanding and well-accepted meaning."" According to Scalia,
something done corruptly is "done with an intent to give some
112. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (2012) (soliciting a bribe); see also id. at §
666(a)(2) (giving a bribe).
113. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1997); Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 604-06 (2004).
114. See Salinas 552 U.S. 52; Sabri, 541 U.S. 600.
115. See Salinas 552 U.S. 52; Sabri, 541 U.S. 600.
116. United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 434 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting
"Congress enacted section 666 to extend the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 201"). For more
discussion on the intent element of 18 U.S.C. § 666, see Jared W. Olen, The Devil's
in the Intent: Does 18 U.S.C § 666 Require Proof of Quid-Pro-Quo Intent?, 42 Sw.
L. REv. 229, 244-48 (2012).
117. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
118. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others."ll 9
Yet this definition still begs the question: what is the duty of a public
official, and when does an advantage become inconsistent with that
duty and the rights of others?
One way to answer this question is to examine the duty of public
officials in light of political philosophy, focusing on legislators as the
archetypal public figure. In his article, Political Bribery and the
Intermediate Theory of Politics, Daniel Lowenstein discusses how
different political theories posit different moral requirements for
legislators. 120 A person's choice of political theory would affect his or
her perception of which bribe-like conduct would be corrupt.
Lowenstein notes that bribery laws themselves tend to be written
broadly.121 To avoid over-breadth, he suggests that "corruptly"
should be construed to require the bribe be "contrary to the public
interest." 122
Because "corruptly" depends on one's concept of duty (per Justice
Scalia) or the public interest (per Lowenstein), political philosophy
can act as a guide for delineating the duty legislators owe to the
public.123  The classic political debate is the "Burkean debate"
between the trusteeship theory and the mandate theory.1 24 Under the
trusteeship theory, a legislator's duty is to rely on his own wisdom and
conscience to do what he believes is best for his constituents.1 25 Thus,
any political pressure whatsoever would tend to "corrupt" the
legislator from the exercise of his own judgment and wisdom.' 26
According to Lowenstein, therefore, the trusteeship theory makes no
119. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
120. See generally Lowenstein, Theory ofPolitics, supra note 16.
121. By way of example, a New York appellate court, in People v. Hochberg,
held that campaign support and fundraising assistance could count as bribes. People
v. Hochberg, 62 A.2d 239, 246 (N.Y.S. 1978).
122. Lowenstein, Theory ofPolitics, supra note 16, at 803.
123. Id. at 831. For a discussion of the definition of corrupt intent from an
economic standpoint, see Alex Stein, Corrupt Intentions: Bribery, Unlawful
Gratuity, and Honest-Services Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (2012).
124. Lowenstein, Theory ofPolitics, supra note 16, at 831-32.
125. Id. at 833-34.
126. Id.
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comprehensible distinction between corrupt and non-corrupt political
pressures.127
Under the mandate theory, a legislator's duty is to do what his
constituents want, to be bound by their mandates and instructions. 128
Thus, pressure that does not reflect popular preferences undermines
proper representation. 129 A bribe that is consistent with popular
preferences, therefore, would not be corrupt, while a bribe that causes
the legislator to deviate from popular preferences would be. 130
Finding no definitive answer in political theory, Lowenstein
proceeds to discuss bribery in terms of the type of harm it inflicts.
Bribery can be intrinsically harmful, especially when the bribe appeals
almost exclusively to an official's self-interests,'31 or it can be
harmful because it births bad decisions, such as when bribery creates
unacceptable advantages for the wealthy and well-organized.132 Both
concepts of corruption apply when a jury is instructed that "corruptly"
is an element that requires an intuitive judgment of moral
blameworthiness.
Another aspect of political philosophy relevant to this discussion
is preference intensity.133 Preference intensity suggests minority
opinions may justly trump majority opinions when they are more
intensely held than majority opinions. 134 For example, imagine that in
a group of one hundred constituents, seventy people favor policy A
with an intensity level of two. This would give policy A one hundred
and forty intensity points. Now imagine that the other thirty people
127. Id.
128. Id. at 834-36.
129. Id.
130. Id. Lowenstein also discusses a third political philosophy, Pluralism. See
id. at 837-40. Unlike the Burkean debate, Pluralism is not normative. Id. Rather,
Pluralism simply describes the political process in terms of pressures exerted by
interest groups. Id. The idea of corruption makes little sense in this context-
bribery would be but one of many forms of pressure that drive the morally neutral
political machine. See id.
131. Id. at 844.
132. Id. at 848-50.
133. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic
Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787,
1795-99 (1992).
134. Id.
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favor policy B, and are very passionate about it, favoring policy B
with an intensity level of seven. This would give policy B two
hundred and ten intensity points. Under a mandate theory, a legislator
sensitive to preference intensity would rightfully support policy B,
even though it is not the preference of the majority of his or her
constituents.
Preference intensity applies to bribery in the context of campaign
contributions because individuals and interest groups with intense
preferences for particular policies will make campaign contributions
in ways that express their policy preferences.' 3 ' These contributions
may not be corrupt in the sense that they simply inform legislators of
intensely held preferences among their constituencies.' 3 6 The United
States Supreme Court has observed that money, when given in the
form of a campaign contribution, can be a form of speech or, at least a
speech-enabler. '1 So long as legislators are not making reciprocal
promises, such as "I will support your issue in exchange for your
contribution," no corruption has taken place. The official has not
violated his duty, and the public has not been disserved. The official
will know what his constituents want, and this knowledge will likely
influence his future decisions. Moreover, if the official was
influenced by intensity of preference, rather than avarice, a jury may
legitimately find the official committed no crime.
Another way to arrive at a workable definition of the "corruptly"
element is to approach the element historically. Sociologist and law
professor James Lindgren surveyed the historical roots of bribery and
extortion and found the crimes overlapped theoretically, historically,
and pragmatically. 138 Lindgren concluded these crimes were rooted in
"the misuse of a representative power for personal gain." 39 The evil
135. For example, the hypothetical NRA campaign contributions. See
discussion supra Part I.
136. See Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111, 127 (1995) (explaining how political money is a
measure of preference intensity, albeit an impure one).
137. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (discussing the effects of
statutory limits on campaign contributions and expenditures on the First Amendment
right to free expression).
138. James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-
Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695, 1738 (1993).
139. Id.
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these laws sought to eradicate was the avarice of public officials. 140
The difference was that bribery laws criminalize both the giver and
the recipient of the bribe, while extortion laws punished only the
public official. 141 This historical overlap also accounts for the
similarities between bribery and Hobbs Act extortion. 142  Lindgren
asserts that corruption forms the core of both bribery and extortion
and that the quid pro quo requirement is a more recent element, which
serves to limit the vagueness inherent in "corruptly."1 43  This
historical perspective helps correct the common mistake, based on a
misreading of Sun-Diamond,144 that bribery is essentially-or even
exclusively-defined in terms of a quid pro quo. 14 5
Another historical analysis is that of Eric Tamashasky. His study
focuses on the meaning of the term "corruptly," beginning at its roots
in English common law, and "duty" and "rights," which are embedded
in the concept of political corruption. 14 6 New York's Field Code of
1865, for example, defines "corruptly" in terms of "a wrongful design
to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage." 47 A treaty
from the 1999 Council of Europe defines "corruption" in terms of
"distort[ing] the proper performance of any duty" and an "undue
140. Id. at 1704-05 ("[The earliest English bribery statute and extortion statute
were both] clearly focused on the acquisitive uses that can be put to state power,
rather than the distortion of official decisionmaking .... The concern seemed to be
greedy officials, rather than powerful subjects distorting government.").
141. Lindgren's "lay definition of bribery" is that "bribery is a corrupt benefit
given or received to influence official action so as to afford the giver better than fair
treatment." Id. at 1699.
142. See id. at 1740 ("[F]rom the earliest discussions of the crime of bribery in
the common law treatises (Coke and Hawkins) through the twentieth century,
bribery has been understood as a 'color of office' offense.").
143. Id. at 1738 (noting that, while the reciprocity requirement of Hobbs Act
extortion articulated in Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 225 (1992), was not
required by the common law of extortion, the reciprocity requirement does serve to
limit the statute to the most common and easily prosecuted forms of serious
corruption).
144. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
145. See, for example, United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002),
discussed supra Part II.A.
146. See Tamashasky, supra note 31. Tamashasky advocates defining
"corruptly" as "with the purpose to secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or
another." Id. at 145.
147. Id. at 132.
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advantage." 48  In both early and contemporary law, therefore,
corruption is tied to wrongfulness, duty, and advantage. Tamashasky
believes the different meanings of "corruptly" that have emerged in
federal courts stem from the different meanings of "unlawful
advantage," which emerge on a case-by-case basis.149
Tamashasky further explains that, under English common law,
crimes were divided into two categories: crimes against the laws of
God and crimes against the laws of man. 150 Crimes against the laws
of God were classified by the term "corruptly."' 5 1 Under this regime,
"corruptly" was not an element of the crime, but a way of classifying
the crime as an inherently immoral act-one that was malum in se, as
opposed to mala prohibita.152
Whether historically or philosophically approached, the definition
of corruption appears to spring from the concepts of duty, improper
advantage, and morality. Therefore, anti-bribery laws should be
construed in such a way as to capture only the political quid pro quos
that controvert an official's moral duty or create an unfair advantage.
Whether a quid pro quo is corrupt is better decided by the moral
intuition of a jury than by a one-size-fits-all definition.
IV. CONCLUSION-WHEN IS A CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION CORRUPT?
Campaign contributions can be corruptly given under several
circumstances. For example, a donor may condition a campaign
contribution on the candidate's promise to perform a particular future
act. Conversely, a candidate may promise a particular act, on the
condition that a contribution is given. In both circumstances, there is
a quid pro quo-the reciprocity that distinguishes bribery and
extortion from an unlawful gratuity. In both circumstances, there is
also corruption. The bribing donor seeks an unfair advantage for
himself; the soliciting official seeks self-enrichment in ways that
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 133.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 136 (demonstrating, from Justice Willes's 1854 opinion in
Cooper v. Slade, 27 L.J.R. 449 (Q.B. 1858), that the word "corruptly" "classifies
conduct rather than explicitly defining it").
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subvert both his ability to apply his unbiased judgment and to fairly
represent his constituents.
By requiring an "evil state of mind" to satisfy corrupt intent, the
law criminalizes corrupt behavior without criminalizing more benign
political behavior, such as logrolling and interest group contributions,
which neither corrupt public officials nor betray public trust.
Moreover, narrowing the corrupt intent element is harmonious with
the United States Supreme Court's stated preference that federal anti-
corruption laws should be narrowly construed.'53
Political contributions involving a corrupt quid pro quo can be
prosecuted under § 201(b), if the bribe concerns federal officials,154 or
§ 666, if the bribery relates to an entity receiving sufficient federal
funds.15 5 If a bribe involves mails or interstate wires, it can also be
prosecuted as a scheme to defraud the public of the right to honest
services under § 1346.156 And, if the bribe affects interstate
commerce "in any way," it can be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act. 5 7
Under each of these statutes, a finding of corrupt intent is necessary to
avert the danger of over-inclusiveness. Additionally, with respect to
§§ 201 and 666 offenses, the corrupt intent element must embody
something beyond the quid pro quo to avoid the problem of statutory
surplusage. Specifically, the "corruptly" element demands that the
quid pro quo was offered or solicited with an "evil mind." Such a
finding is a moral judgment well-suited for jury determination.
While some jury instructions make the corrupt intent element
explicit, not all do. This article therefore suggests, as a potentially
helpful jury instruction:
"Corruptly" means that the defendant acted with an immoral
purpose to secure an improper advantage for himself in violation of
his (or the official's) duty to the public. Not every quid pro quo
involving a public official is wrong or illegal. You the jury must
find not only that a specific agreement existed, but that this
agreement was morally blameworthy.
153. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 406-07
(1999).
154. See Part I, supra.
155. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
156. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
157. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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Such an instruction would allow the jury to draw on its own
collective moral intuition to decide whether the alleged arrangement
was designed to enrich either the giver or the recipient in
contravention of the official's duty to the public.
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